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NEW INTER-PARTY RELATIONS OF THE
HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS’ PARTY
AFTER THE PRAGUE SPRING
The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the establishment
of the theoretical base and frontiers of Eurocommunism
At the 40th anniversary of the 1968 events the effects of the reforms created
by the Prague Spring and the consequences of the Soviet military intervention
are rightly discussed extensively. The present study would like to introduce a
so far less examined topic, the reaction ofWest European, especially the Italian
and French communist parties, the beginning of their gradual disaffection
from the Soviet Union and their search for an alternative way, which featured
the leftist and anti-capitalist movements in the 1960s. The breakaway from
the Stalinist past, as well as its political content, were at stake.
The program and the new orientation of the Communist Party of Czecho-
slovakia (KSČ), headed by Alexander Dubček who stood for socialism with a
human face, nourished hope for Western communist parties that there was
hope to change and reform “Eastern systems”. The communist parties of Italy,
France and Spain, which would later establish eurocommunism, were now able
to represent a joint platform: strictly rejecting all arguments for the need for
a Soviet intervention proposed by the Soviets and their allies in the region –
contrary to their different opinions on the 1956 revolution in Hungary. While
these parties tried to explain the 1956 events in Budapest and the Tito-Stalin
split as advances of right-wing revisionism, and interpreted the sins of Stalin as
results of the confused paranoiac mind of a dictator but putting an artificial
end from outside to the reforms in Prague, which were also popular at their
home, and the recurring harsh intervention in the life of a sovereign country
became a dividing line in the relationship between European communists
and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).Western communists
mostly raised three questions: 1. What kind of people are leading the Soviet
Union, in fact? 2. How can these corrupt leaders match the opening and new
style in Soviet politics – allegedly in the pipeline – with suppressing a com-
munist experience which was based on democratic and pluralistic principles
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while not questioning the leading role of the single-party running the state?
3. According to their experience, rulers inMoscow hadmade a series ofmistakes,
and their attitude and guidelines given by them had not changed a lot over the
years passed. Is the superpower that theoretically confronted the heritage of
Stalin really a post-Stalinist state? Could the idea of Soviet superpower give up
its insistence on hierarchical power structures, and understand the importance
of differences arising from the different historical-economical developments?
The unexpected application of the “Brezhnev doctrine” further under-
mined the already gradually weakening ideological links of the Italian and
French communists to Moscow. Several members of the Spanish communist
party, which was forced into illegality by the Franco regime, gained refuge in
Prague. Their political activities, including the operation of a radio station,
were organised fromhere. They were participating in the public life lead by the
KSČ and felt personally the approval of and popular support to the reforms.
Of course, similar to the Italian and theFrench communist parties (PCI andPCF)
they did not accept the Soviet doctrine of the casus belli, that is the reference
to imperialism and counter-revolution that was repeated every time with little
content. The PCI and PCF saw that the superpowers were coming closer, thus
also utilising the safety of Western democracies and their economic develop-
ment they became the opinion leaders in strictly condemning the August 1968
military action. The dissent group spearheading the need for a different way
of socialist development and advocating full independence of communist
parties and countries had not yet arrived to announce eurocommunism but its
main lines had been shaped. About this period, these parties dropped the
exclusive power of the proletariat, the need for the one-party system and the
party as the ruling elite from their program–mostly due to the bitter experience
of the Prague spring and the following autumn. Although they were not able
to go further that time but they succeeded in postponing the scheduled next,
Moscow meeting and consultation of communist and workers’ parties. They
made trouble, although marginally. This was specially reflected in the rela-
tionship and links of the PCI and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party
(MSZMP), in a period when Hungary was engaged in decisive reforms in the
form of launching the new economic mechanism. Related documents produced
by the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of MSZMP depicted a
changing relationship between Western communist ideas and the forced reali-
ty of the actually existing socialism shaped from Moscow.
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The PCI and the invasion in Czechoslovakia
The PCI strongly opposed the Soviet intervention. Naturally, reflecting the
openness of this party, certain counter-opinions were also expressed but the
youth organisations of the party also joined the platform judging the elimi-
nation of the Prague spring as negative development. Secretary Luigi Longo
made his related account at the meeting of the Central Committee on August
28, 1968. His report was discussed a day later both by the Central Committee
and the Central Supervisory Committee a day later – at closed meetings. They
concluded that there was not any moment when the possibility for capitalist
restoration was open, this was specially stressed by Paolo Bufalini, and there
was not any actual imperialist threat: “dissonant voices and anti-socialism
were isolated, and leaders of the KSČ fully controlled the situation.”1Among the
makers of nationwide politics in PCI, Giancarlo Pajetta and Giorgio Amen-
dola raised objection against the measures of Moscow. Both agreed with the
report presented by Longo. Amendola highlighted that the present stand of
Italian communists had been in harmony with their activities both during the
period of antifascist fight and over the 23 years passed after. He pointed to the
theories of Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti to be followed, especially
stressing on the given situation the Yalta memoirs of the latter. He ended his
argument with the following remark: “we cannot expect that the emancipation
from capitalist exploitation will be brought about world campaigns, as the Chinese
communists want, or this can be achieved by actions of socialist countries, as Soviet
comrades – as it seems – think.”2
Pajetta expressed that they reached a compromise in Moscow but had not
signed a pact. This differentiation was very important for Italian communists.
Nevertheless, this compromise prevented a catastrophe. In fact, the unity of
the leading group of KSČ surmounted those who believed that this unity was
over. Pajetta considered positive that in addition to the Italian communist party
several other ones, including the French, Finnish, Spanish, Scandinavian and
Japanese parties distanced themselves from the Soviet intervention. All sup-
ported the proposal of PCI to establish a broader opposition in international
(communist) organisations, with the not concealed goal to prevent in the fu-
ture – or by other words to veto – the political-military steps of certain socialist
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2 Ibid. 40.
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countries – especially the Soviet Union – which violate the basic values of the
international labour movement.
According to them, the intervention of the Warsaw Pact represented the
logic of blocks and wanted to break the process of rebirth: the first attempt to
make Eastern bloc countries – where private property of means of labour was
abolished – aware of the contradictions within their societies and try to settle
these contradictions in a fair manner within the basic power structure.3 Their
starting point was, unquestionably, commitment for the communist party, the
socialist way and the democratic rebirth of the socialist society (and its future
stabilisation). They believed that despite the difficult situation the KSČ
would regain its independence and its full freedom in decisions that would
forward the idea of a renewal of the socialist society, while they would strictly
protect socialist achievements against any risk and any attempt to abolish them.4
“In order to advance toward this direction, we turn with a request to the
concerned parties and governments, especially to the CPSU and the govern-
ment of the Soviet Union, to make all necessary measures to restore ordinary
life in Czechoslovakia by the withdrawal of the troops. In our opinion, this is
the first step that should be done in order to heal wounds, and tomake internal
relations within the community of socialist countries the base for improving
cooperation in all fields and strengthening real unity – respecting the inde-
pendence and sovereignty of each country. (…) It is necessary to find the way
and form, meanwhile respecting the autonomy and independence of each
party, to set joint points and goals for the West-European communist parties.”5
They considered holding the nextmeeting of communist andworkers parties
useless until the situation in Czechoslovakia was settled finally and reassuring.
Naturally, Longo rejected the criticism of Ambrogio Donini6, who expressed
his discontent in his speech with the party leadership opposing the interven-
tion of the five countries in Czechoslovakia and who underlined that this
strengthens the bourgeois propaganda.
It is worth to cite the words of Longo again, who excellently managed the
crisis, on the one hand rejecting the accusations of the Italian socialists and
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3 Ibid. 41. (in italics, underlined in the original with a remark added: „if it were so”)
4 Ibid. 45-46. (remark: „= no”)
5 Ibid.
6 Marxist historian (1903–1991). He was a lecturer in Rome in 1926–1928 and later in Bari
1960–1971, ambassador to Poland in 1947 and PCI-delegatedmember of the Senate in 1953–1963.
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social democrats and on the other hand distancing himself and his party
from the Soviets. “Actual considerations concerning the situation in Czecho-
slovakia, according to our opinion, cannot be separated from those theoretical
motivations, which urged us to clearly reject the military intervention. These
theoretical motivations – on the fundaments of which all our theoretical
work and politics are built – are based on the respect of the autonomy of each
communist party and each country, as a consequence of which is that the
development of the socialist democracy should not be broken.” 7
Further keywords of his speech were to improve the respect for the Soviet
Union and the endeavour towards peaceful coexistence. By this, he criticised
again – indirectly – the Prague intervention, and was speaking about the drop
in the prestige of the big brother in the East. It is important to underline that
he did not split with Moscow, but demonstrating the independence of the
PCI he dared to express sharp criticism. The politics of the party was built on
the Gramsci-Togliatti ideological axe and the basic principles announced at
the 20th Congress, thus making obvious the “betrayal” of the foreign policy
of Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko.
“Well, we have to tell that the intervention in Czechoslovakia is opposing
this political line; it opposes main problems of articulating political and civil
life; opposes facing and fighting this line in socialist countries or limiting it
in any way – as well as all other tendencies to intervene, even military, in the
internal affairs of other parties or countries.”8 The basic elements of the solu-
tion proposed by the PCI were an analytical examination of the situation and
harmonised international (foreign) policy. They wanted to reposition the Ita-
lian communist party on themap of international labourmovements: stressing
several times the voluntarily feature of the Western communist movement,
where its support and (political) strength could be measured by democratic
methods. The rearrangement of the power structure, the advance harmonisa-
tion of foreign policy moves, would deprive Moscow from its advantages that
were almost considered as natural, and would question its political monopoly
in theWarsaw Pact. As a result, Longo – if he could – referred to the results of
the Karlovy Vary Conference, because no other communist party, especially in
the East, had been so brave and creative over the period since then, proposing
a realistic analysis of the situation. The political passivity of the really existing
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socialism suppressed all initiatives for change. “What is the reason for this
smaller drive, which sometimes makes the impression that socialist countries
in Europe are rather waiting for changes than initiating them or taking a
proactive position? This is a topic that obviously requires deeper analysis.
Without trying to give a complete answer, we can say that this lack of initiatives is
rooted in an explanation of the situation, according to which imperialism has
not become stronger but is more aggressive. It is unquestionable that imperialism
steadily continues its attacks. We know it very well, since we have to fight its
propaganda and the different forms of its ideological activity every day. (…)
Nevertheless, we always pay attention not to consider persons who express one or
other aspects of the capitalist and neo-capitalist ideology as agents of imperialism. We
always pay attention to making ideological gains with our actions, trusting in
the validity and vitality of Marxism. And we do this with results in a country,
where the determining majority of communication tools – starting with the
most popular these days the television – are controlled by our enemies.”9
Longo applied skilful the concepts of political opponent and enemy. Con-
cerning mass media, he spoke of enemies, in order to stage the situation bet-
ter, but concerning international politics he used the less dividing term of
opponents, without referring to actual countries or military alliance. Thus in
many cases, the context reveals that it is the Soviet Union, which is repre-
sented by the actual political opponent. According to them, the democratic
unity, which is based on debates, cannot be bureaucratic at all.
Freely interpreting Togliatti, Longo pointed out several times that since
the Yalta process they had received little help to present the ideological base-
lines of the 20th Congress, especially (little) from countries where counter-
part communist parties controlled social life completely. “Furthermore, we
got the impression that this help is especially diminishing by a phenomenon
called ideological aggression. The necessary and indispensable lessons should
be different, profoundly different, that all communist and workers parties
should learn from the mistake of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia.
We expect greater momentum in foreign policy – concerning Europe – in the
fight for security and overcoming political blocks.”10
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At the same time, to obviously demonstrate his loyalty to the community
of Marxists-Leninists – he still considered – led by Moscow, Longo also con-
demned the US aggression against Vietnam. With skilled tactics he did not
make parallel between the twomilitary actions (although this analogy was att-
ractive, despite their substantial differences) but used both sorrowful actions
as a critique of the politics of international security, or more precisely the two
large opposing military blocks.
The representative of theMSZMP,Hungary’s Ambassador to Italy József Száll11
met Carlo Galuzzi and other members of the Central Committee of the PCI
but due to long discussions the report on his visit was written only on August
31, 1968.12 Italian communists made all their best to maintain relationships
with their East-European counterparties, including the Hungarian one. It is
likely that they were aware of the attitude of János Kádár at his meetings in
Komárom andÁgcsernyő, where he supported his fresh ally Dubček also war-
ning him to be moderate and cautious. Bilateral connections of the PCI were
frozen only with the GDR. Both Budapest and Rome knew that events were
developing on diverted paths. Both considered that the situation in Czecho-
slovakia could be normalised by renewed talks and compromising negotia-
tions.
From the report of Száll, it is obvious that the PCI got up-to-date infor-
mation from events in Prague, thus they were able to develop an opinion
independently from the news flow by TASS. The PCI sent its old and well
experienced members to spend their holidays in Czechoslovakia, and they
reported experiences different from the announcements made by the “five”
invaders. “They have not seen any trace of the counter-revolutionary threat.”13 The
Italians objected that they had not received advance information from the
Soviets thus the military action found them unprepared. They also ques-
tioned the Soviet announcement objecting the lack of the leading role of the
KSČ, since the leadership of the party still was respected by masses to a cer-
tain extent during the crisis, and it was able to control the country and its own
political work.
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13 Ibid. 54.
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On the international scene, the invasion in Prague helped Richard Nixon
to win elections, made the future complicated for Cuba, and hindered the
solution of the Vietnam question. After the military action of the five coun-
tries, chances to advance in improving the security in Europe were reduced,
and the enforcement of the decrees made in Karlovy Vary was questioned.
The fight for dissolving military blocks strictly lost its all hopes. Italians con-
sidered the damage made to the international labour movement even more
serious, since they expected rightly that the prestige of the Soviet Union
would drop globally. Leaders of the PCI classified the measures exclusively as
personal faults of the Soviet leadership thus preventing party members and
others “to raise questions about the feature of the system, and identifying it
with the actions made, which were – according to them – unnecessary and
wrongly timed.”14
TheMoscowmeeting was taken off from the agenda completely. The parties
of the “four”minor allies of the invaders could be isolated at least partially, thus
giving more room for the Chinese and their supporters – argued Galuzzi.
Italians found especially harmful the aftermath of the crisis developed
after the events in Czechoslovakia on Italian internal politics. They were
afraid of losing further votes, and of a united front developing fromChristian
democrats to socialists against them, which could undermine the popularity of
the party and might hinder the PCI to become a constructive member of the
ruling majority in the Parliament thus actively promoting different aspects of
social development in Italy.
At the moment of the invasion in Prague, Pajetta and Longo were in Mos-
cow, while Amendola was in Bulgaria. It is especially worth to mention that
even in this locations they did not know anything about the military prepara-
tions against Czechoslovakia.
According to his report, personal feelings of Száll were anyhow positive on
the steps made by the Italian communists. “The Italian party leadership is
aiming to understand the situation better thus as a result to change its earlier
opinion gradually and slowly.”15Nevertheless, in Budapest leaders were aware
that it would not pay off to increase tensions withWestern, especially the Italian
and French parties up to leading to a split. The Central Committee also felt
the unwillingness of Hungarians in fulfilling their duties. The days and weeks
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following the invasion were filled with debates on explaining and interpreting
the events, several times with strictly opposing views and palliations. In a
strictly military sense, the Soviet action of occupation was well prepared and
successful but at the same time foreign policy leaders in Moscow had again
been proven incompetent in mitigating the damage in prestige – if there were
any chance to prepare for that. Nevertheless, the Soviets should have to be very
naive to expect loyalty from theWestern communist parties, when they started
to distance themselves from Moscow, as well from Budapest, especially due
to the “Prague autumn”. Limited by its room to manoeuvre, the leadership of
MSZMP “followed” the changing PCI and PCF but its role subordinated to
the USSR prevented the actual chance of a break-through.
Because Longo was not in Rome at the time of the invasion, the Political
Bureau of the PCImaintained its earlier stand – in his the absence. This, accor-
ding to Száll, could have been also influenced by the fact that “the situation
in Czechoslovakia has not settled at all, the talks in Moscow have not ended
and they had no information on the outlook of its development.”16
After the “agreement reached by negotiations” in Moscow, Longo slightly
altered his opinion and the stand of his party. In his account made at the
Central Committee, which was presented also by the Hungarian state news
agencyMTI, he expressed the need for solidarity with the East European com-
munist parties but at the same time he repeated the earlier announcement of
his party made on the August 21 events. The PCI refreshed the idea of soli-
darity, because it was afraid of a possible anti-communist campaign in Italy
and in the West. They underlined the importance of the often mentioned
fight against Atlanticism and reaction forces, although they were urged soon
to team up with the Christian democrats by the lessons learnt from the Soviet
intervention.
In the words of Száll: “My personal belief is that the concluding speech of
comrade Longo held at the Central Committee has signs of certain development
further [in the right direction]. We have to judge also positively that based on
the guidelines of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau has decided to
exchange views with leaders of the important communist parties, including
the ones which took part in the action in Czechoslovakia.”17 The Hungarian
foreign politician was keen on mentioning that all ambassadors of socialist
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countries in Rome had similar interpretation of the events as Budapest and the
PCI was mostly annoying the Soviet diplomats – which can easily be under-
stood. Nevertheless, hemade no comments concerning the Embassy of Prague.
Concerning the internal fight in the PCI, theMSZMPwas mostly interested
in Amendola gaining more power, who – according to Száll – subordinated
the “international duties” of his party under Italian internal policy interests.
“His standpoint is mostly formed by the expected reaction of other Italian
parties to his statements, whether these announcements improve or damage the
connections of the party to socialist and Catholic masses established during
the elections. That is why they avoid or even ignore the larger historical context and the
needs of the international labour movement. This kind of critique is obviously
right and can be agreed with.”18
Száll repeatedly underlined the influence of the PCI in the West, since he
was well aware that left movements in the Mediterranean area were more
influenced by Longo than by Brezhnev of the far away Moscow – especially
after the Prague spring. The PCI “which was so far the most important base
of socialist ideas and human development in the capitalist world, thus the
reunification with this party is an unavoidable historical necessity.”19
Although argumentations of the two parties were strictly opposite, they
tried to do all – also based on the proposals made by Száll – to “restore the
unity on theoretical foundations, abolishing the sorrowful split.” Inner circles
of the MSZMP were right to hope again that the situation would get a posi-
tive turn, since the PCI had a history of revising – at least partially – its earlier
standpoints, like it did concerning 1956. Based on this hope, Pajetta who visited
Budapest in the second week of September 1968 was received at the highest
level of the MSZMP.
In its classified report made on September 13, 1968, MTI mentioned the
comment of AFP judging the visit of Pajetta and Armando Cossutta positive.
AFP learnt that Hungarian and Romanian leaders tolerated the Italian opinions
the most, according to which the normalisation in Czechoslovakia should be
reached before the next meeting of the communist and workers parties in
Moscow. Otherwise there was a threat that a split might develop in the already
fragile unity of the labour movement. Italian communist leaders were satis-
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fied that Romanians and Yugoslavs were supporting their proposals, and the
Hungarian leadership was tolerating them with sympathy.20
There were wide range reactions in the Italian press that Alexei Kosygin
and Oldřich Černík had signed an agreement to keep Soviet troops in Czecho-
slovakia. Il Messaggero even published an editorial on it under the title “The
Last Chapter”. “With their presence in Prague the Soviets celebrated not only
that they employed physical aggression against a nation with the help of tanks
but also the renouncement of theoretical principles, promises and obligations
which had been repeatedly announced over the preceding dozen years. They
desecrated all that they had said since 1956 about the right for different ways
leading to socialism, the independence of socialist countries, which was con-
firmed by Brezhnev himself two years ago.” According toTempo, the short visit
ofKosyginpaid inPrague servedonly the approval of the gallows-tree agreement.21
The PCI held its congress in Bologna on January 26, 1969, which was featured by
debates on the open problems (the decrees of Karlovy Vary, the abolition of
blocks, the activity of China and the situation in Czechoslovakia). Alessandro
Natta also contributed to the debate on the document made to prepare for the
congress. According to him, the era of military blocks had ended, thus the
creations of the cold war were obsolete. The politics of peaceful co-existence was
based on the desire for and activity aiming the independence and autonomy
of nations, the freedom of social and political choices and the free develop-
ment of countries. Natta was dreaming about an Italian foreign policy which
was fighting for the abolishment of blocks, including NATO. According to
him, a centrist-left coalition is unfeasible and the time had come to establish
a democratic alternative to it.22 Although Longo did not mention directly the
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crisis in Czechoslovakia but he made strong remarks referring to the events
happened just two months before. “In our movement, the actual problem
emerging now is the ability to evaluate the differences in revolutionary
processes with a historic and actual approach, that we can explore the common
base of these revolutionary processes, without losing their sense. We should
not let them suppressed by the differences and contradictions that emerge
during revolutionary developments.” Connected to this he aptly quoted
Togliatti: “The communist movement should be united not only at the national
but also at the international level. This unity can be reached in two ways. It can
be the result of external pressure, the mechanic adoption of orders given by
others and servile imitation.We reject that. On the other hand, such a unity is also
possible, which reflects the different experiences and uniqueness, which is nourished
by mutual critical approach, and which is strengthened by the autonomy of the given
parties. We need this second type of unity. We should be united, because our
principles are the same and we are following the same goals. Our unity is a
model of the international society we are fighting for. Where all nations will
be equal, free and brothers.”23
The lines above indicate that the future growing distance between the Soviet
and Italian communists, the birth of eurocommunism was invisibly present
in the fundamentally different interpretation of Marxism by the CPSU and
PCI. Looking onto the events from this angle, the series of conflicts and the
specific steps of the Soviet Union were predictable. Nevertheless, the fate of the
two parties tied them in. Reflecting this, Longo remarked that “the defence of
the socialist world is obviously such a problem, which should be in the focus of
all communist parties, democrats, the whole developing world and progres-
sive movements.”24This comment also had double meaning, because it could
be interpreted as defending either the Prague reforms or the socialism with a
human face. That is why he added that “but this problem should be explored
now with regard to present realities and various layers, and from the angle of
present components, thus helping to find its solution. The development of each
component also has different reasons.” His strongest argument was the con-
sequence of the above thoughts, the next step in the logical chain. “What are
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the reasons of the existence and emergence of these differences of opinion,
conflicts and splits? The simplest – although unsatisfactory – answer is that
they are rooted in the rightist or leftist deviations of this or that kind of par-
ties; and the solution should be sought in ‘the rigorous fight against any devia-
tions fromMarxist-Leninist principles and against nationalist, dogmatic and
revisionist distortions’ – as it was written recently.”25 Looking at the roots of
the differences objectively, he expressed that they existed naturally between the
different socialist countries as well as between communist and workers par-
ties. He found it strange that Hermann Axen, who should have been aware of
the above statements, made a critical remark in the theoretical journal of the
German Socialist Unity Party (SED) concerning the PCI: “in relationships
between communist and workers parties as well as with socialist countries the
most important principle is not the autonomy or sovereignty of each com-
munist parties.”26
Italians, that can be understood, insisted on the opinion also expressed at
the 23rd Congress of the CPSU that principles of equality, autonomy and non
intervention in internal affairs of others should be strictly observed. As a con-
clusion, addressing it to Moscow in a not really concealed way, they renewed
the “unity in diversity” principle of Togliatti. “If they really want to work on
unity then they should strictly respect the autonomy of parties as well as of
socialist countries and should make (actual) steps to achieve it. If these prin-
ciples are revised, questioned or violated then they do not help the case of
unity but induce even larger splits. We have to start from diversity, if we want to
progress towards unity.”27
Pajetta arrived in Budapest by the initiative of the PCI to talk over the
events in Czechoslovakia. He arrived on September 9, 1968 and left for Rome
in the morning of September 12. Over this period he met twice with Zoltán
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Komócsin,28 on 10 and 11 September.29 Pajetta emphasized that the statement
of the PCI condemning the intervention was based on their established politi-
cal line followed after the 20th Congress of the CPSU thus it wasmade by theore-
tical considerations not on tactical grounds. The Presidency and the Central
Committee was united inmaking these decrees, only Donini opposed them at
the Central Committee meeting but he could not argue against them. The
meeting of the Central Committee rejected any attempts to fight or isolate the
parties of the concerned five socialist countries. Party units discussed the stand
of the Italian party atmeetings and forums and generally they approved it. There
were simpler partymembers, who said if the SovietUnion had done it then it had
to have a reason for that. The visitors led by Pajetta considered the Moscow
agreement as a compromise but as a positive one, and they did not want to
discuss how it had been reached – indicating its conditions. “For them it is a
priority not to do anything that would not support the group in Czechoslovakia, who
have signed the above agreement in Moscow.” According to Pajetta, certain articles
of Pravda andTribuna Luduwere just making the situation evenmore difficult
for this group.They did not knowhow the parties of the concerned five countries
valued the group, which was in power in Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1968
or whether they regarded this group able to execute the agreement. Leaders of
the PCI considered that the withdrawal of the troops of socialist countries,
the restoration of the autonomy of the KSČ and its independent work were
prerequisites for normalising the situation in Czechoslovakia. The Moscow
agreement should be executed by both parties they said.
Their opinion on the coming (international) meeting (in Moscow) had
already been told by Longo in a press interview. The base of their thinking was
that the debate arising from the different evaluation of the events in Czechoslovakia
could not be avoided in the situation given that time; and it would not have a positive
compromise but would sharpen the divisions and might lead to a split as the worst.
“According to their analysis, the situation is serious and even worse than it
was in 1956. They think that a decade of their work for the European safety,
against the NATO and for establishing the unity of left-wing forces has been
questioned, and several theoretical questions like the peaceful co-existence,
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the peaceful transformation into socialism, the democracy in building socialism
and the possibility of a multi-party system etc. have became problematic again.
Their feelings towards the Soviet Union were shaken. The sympathy for the
Soviet Union has deep roots in their party and cadres but Italian comrades
feel wounded. They take this into account and they have to repair a serious
damage, and we have to do this work jointly with them. They were worried of
a crisis recurring in each decade. According to them, the relationship between
socialist countries cast a shadow the relationship between parties. They were
also worried that these countries are ready to accept a socialist model of a certain
type only. They find us regarding the border of socialist countries the border
of socialism, and we equalling these two with methods that hinder the spread
of socialism. Comrade Pajetta asked again to trust in their honesty and com-
miseration.”
Changes in the Eastern links of the PCI at the turn of 1968-1969
The relationship between the PCI and the SED had never been characterised
by harmony. Most of the conflicts of the 1960s, which were avoided or not
articulated before, surfaced as they formed fundamentally different opinions on
the reforms in Czechoslovakia. The communication between the two parties,
which anyhow wasmostly formal, got frozen by November 1968. East Germans
realised the unacceptable situation rather late and by the time they finally
decided to act the PCI had already solidly rejected the conflict avoiding the
policy of the previous years in its theses prepared for its congress. Although
late but – surprisingly – the SEDmade real gestures towards the party of Longo.
What could have been a good proposal for negotiations years before that be-
came pointless by the late autumn of 1968 – and not only for the chief secretary.
Thirty years after the Munich Pact, when the Nazis occupied the Sudeten-
land in Czechoslovakia, destroying a state with democratic institutions, a rare
exemption in Central-East Europe that time, German troops crossed the Ore
Mountains again. The differences in the ideological background of the two
“invasions” were obvious, nevertheless – and independent to their different
consequences – they should be regarded as rude external interventions in
internal affairs of a sovereign land. The PCI felt the differences in the social
background of the 1956 events in Hungary and the Czech reforms, and learnt
the lesson from its earlier wrong judgement on the Soviet intervention in the
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Hungarian revolution, thus its answer could not be else that full seclusion
from East Germany. The September plenum of the East German party con-
demned the policy of the PCI and anonymous brochures and flyers criticising
Longo’s views were sent to Italian party members living in East Germany and
to organisations that could be associated with the PCI. Thus, understandably
created fierce reactions in Rome, and the press controlled by the PCI was criti-
cising not only the SED but also the GDR more sharply as ever before. In
mediating between the two parties and partially restoring their links, the Hun-
garian Embassy in Rome contributed a lot. GDR diplomats knew that they
could not reach fundamental success in restoring the damaged relations in
the short term. They could hope only to renew talks but they were not able to
realise this alone.
TheMSZMPhad also to follow a diverted path but the role ofHungary in the
occupation of Czechoslovakia could not be excused, nevertheless it had made
steps to avoid the invasion and to reach a peaceful solution. We can assume
that the PCI was well aware and understand the situation of the Eastern parties,
and their limited room for manoeuvre but it distinguished between following
orders unconditionally and forced discipline. The last can be well illustrated
by the meeting of Kádár and Dubček in Komárom. The Hungarian side had
reasons to worry and it had actual experience about the inflexibility of the
CPSU. The new economic mechanism which was announced in Hungary in
January 1968 could be easily classified as parallel with the reforms in Prague.
While Hungary had great hopes for the success of the attempt of its northern
neighbour to renew socialism and the possible gain from accompanying mar-
ketisation – allowing market forces to work –, other ruling parties of the really
existing socialism were worried about Prague breaking the unity of the Euro-
pean labour movement. On November 28, 1968, Kurt Schnell the second sec-
retary commercial officer of theGDR inRome personally informed Száll about
the first deputy of foreign minister Otto Winzer. According to the report by
Schnell, at the last plenum of the SED “the economic and social situation of
the developed capitalist countries was analysed and based on this some state-
ments were formed on the politics of the Italian party. They did not expect
that Italian comrades would be reacting so fiercely on their announcements.”
Schnell received an order to do all in order to restore good relations with the
PCI. As preparation for the expected large differences in opinions, he was
ordered to avoid sensitive themes thus no engagement in debates over the
Czechoslovak question was recommended. Berlin suggested “discussing” a
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list of topics in which both parties had similar interests or were neutral to
them, thus the success in finding joint platforms was guaranteed. Schnell was
also authorised to talk directly with the highest rank leaders of the PCI. So it
was not just a chance that when he returned to Rome he explained his prog-
ram or “peace plan” first to the Hungarian ambassador, selecting among
friendly countries. The document does not reveal it but it can be suspected
that he could not meet the members of the Italian Central Committee and
leadership without the active help of Száll. The report of the ambassador also
mentions the reasons of the conflict between the two communist parties.
According to Schnell the main reasons leading to the dispute were focusing
on the different interpretation of the Czechoslovak reforms, and there were
other misunderstandings hindering the dialogue. It tells a lot that not even
traces of self-critique can be found in reasons listed by him. A demonstrative
case was when the East German news agency ADN dismissed its colleague,
who was recommended by the PCI, because he was making reports on the
Czechoslovak situation for the RIAS radio station in West Berlin and he also
gave an account for listeners on the standpoint of the Italian party. As an
answer, Rome froze all informal links with Berlin, and only lower rank party
officials took part in already scheduled meetings if they took place at all.
Leaders and secretaries of the PCI were totally absent.
Lessons of the Prague spring
The leadership of the PCI strictly condemned the intervention of the five
member countries of the Warsaw Pact. Longo published a book on the 1968
Czechoslovak events even in the same year.30 Members of the party appara-
tus in general approved the critique on the intervention of the five socialist
countries, and only few lower rank party units declared that the announcement
of the Central Committee was not well considered.31 In the preparation work
for the 12th Congress of the party, which was held in Bologna on February 8-15,
1969 the focus was given on strengthening unity. Moving gradually towards
right, the Italian Socialist Party skilfully utilised the consequences of the
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Czechoslovak developments on Italian internal politics and stole votes from
the PCI. The foreign policy measures of the Soviet Union in fact were the ne-
gation of the election programme announced by Longo thus to maintain cre-
dibility the party had no other choice as really distancing itself fromMoscow.
For this reason the party repeated its earlier decree in Bologna, again con-
demning the Soviet intervention.32 Nevertheless, neither the report on the
state of affairs nor contributions from the floor analysed the problem in
detail, obviously they wanted to avoid the emergence of a likely debate. The
congress approved the policy of Longo,33 thus confirmed that the decision of
Togliatti was right. In the discussion itself, only few mentioned the Czecho-
slovak question. Most of the contributors agreed with the decrees and reports
made by the governing party bodies. Member of the Central Committee Do-
nini – supposedly by the urge of Ingrao – repeated his earlier statement sup-
porting the legality and necessity of the intervention. Interestingly, the re-
formers lead by Amendola – who openly condemned the “Brezhnev doctrine”
– did not react to his statements thus no relevant debate developed. Delegates
of Western communist parties and of the concerned six countries from the
Eastern Block expected the development of a fierce debate but due to the si-
lence kept by the different currents opposing each other in the background,
no open polemic emerged. It seems that the PCI had learnt the lessons from
its experience in the preceding years, when its plurality and internal freedom
did not allow it to defend a united standpoint representing the party. This time
as well, representatives of the different currents had the opportunity to express
their views but this only contributed additional tunes to the statements of the
announcement reached by compromises. The silence of the PCI was a protest,
because they did not want to share the historical responsibility of the Soviet
Block. Although they avoided the sharp critique of the PCSU the speech of
Enrico Berlinguer signalled of an intensifying new and more critical tone.
“The intervention in Czechoslovakia cannot be regarded as a mistake only but its roots
are in the objective contradictions of the socialist world.”34 Berlinguer was rather strong
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in expressing the – by then – urging need for autonomy within the interna-
tional labour movement. The mutual recognition and assurance of the inde-
pendence of different parties became the main message of the congress. That
was the way to express serious accusations – although they were not directly
speaking about the suppression of the Prague spring – about the power
imbalance in the family of communist parties, the main political line of the
congress. This was the real indicator of the effects brought about by the Soviet
intervention. Berlinguer, who enjoyed massive support in elected as deputy
secretary, argued that autonomy meant the right that among others authorises
the Italian communists to form an independent opinion on the measures of
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries without the intention lecturing
anyone on how to build ‘the actually existing socialism’. Nevertheless, they
felt their duty to express their opinion without diplomatic considerations, in
order to help the whole movement. They expected a far less tolerant attitude
of the PCI towards Eastern Block members. At the reception held to honour
foreign delegates, Berlinguer made a “very honest and gripping” toast: “The PCI is
a very complicated party, and sometimes it is hard to understand them. He acknowledged
that they have not done all either to study socialist countries deeper and thoroughly.”35
The congress voted down with overwhelming majority the principles of a
‘leading party’ and ‘leading country’, which were also rejected by Boris Pono-
maryov (Ponomarev) the head of the Soviet delegation. At the same time,
member of the party leadership Galuzzi, who was in charge of international
affairs, strictly rejected the idea of ‘limited sovereignty’ proposed by the CPSU.
As a conclusion of a more than a week long congress, the report of the
Central Committee and the closing speeches of Longo and Berlinguer were
approved with overwhelming majority, only one ‘no’ was cast and 14 refrained
from voting. Thus the PCI embarked on a new period in its history. As the
centre-right weekly Epoca wrote: “Much was said about the crisis of commu-
nism but taking into accounts the facts, we have to acknowledge that the PCI
has overcome a difficult period again. After the congress, its organisation
and tactics were more united as ever.”36
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Effects of the Prague spring on the new mechanism
in Hungary and the PCI
After the suppression of the Prague spring by the rude intervention of the
Soviets, the only acceptable aspect of the actually existing socialism was – at
least for Italian communists – the still running new economic mechanism in
Hungary, which was announced also in 1968. Following the way as the socialism
with a human face announced by Dubček became a model of a certain public
discussion for the future eurocommunist parties, the actually testedHungarian
new economic mechanism – surviving its halt ordered from Moscow – beca-
me part of the program of several Western communist parties – as empirical
evidence. Nevertheless, the most important user of this experience did not
came from the Mediterranean communist and workers parties but was the
Chinese party, which adopted the attempt of the MSZMP realised between
1968 and the middle of the 1970s as its main line.
An intense dialogue started between theMSZMP and the PCI already in early
1968, based on the mutual exchange of experiences.37 The PCI was still con-
demning the military intervention of the five socialist countries and still
maintained its view that the ‘occupation’ of Czechoslovakia ‘means the return to
oldmanners’ and the factual military invasion contradicts principles of equality,
autonomy and not intervening into internal affairs of other parties, the prin-
ciples approved together. Nevertheless, the PCI was open to Budapest.
At the end of 1968 and early 1969, Italian party leaders and the party press
were emphasizing the need for normalising the given situation in Czechoslo-
vakia. They considered normalisation not only including the full withdrawal
of Soviet troops but also as they argued the full restoration of the sovereignty
of Czechoslovakia (the abolition of all forms of intervention, lifting all limiting
measures and demands posed and to express confidence in those in whom
‘the Czechoslovak nation trusts’.)
As a result of the above, party announcements discussed more frequently
that the policy of communist parties in power were determined primarily by
state interests and these were not always identical with the interests of the
international communist and labour movement.
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According to them, the conflicts developed in the past and recently in the
international communist movement should not prevent the joint fight against
imperialism and the unity for actions. They told the Yugoslav party delegate
visiting Italy in 1968 that the PCI was lead by the aim to promote if possible
mutual understanding and solving problems, which were hindering joint ac-
tions. Pajetta said on December 11, 1968 that the PCI had seen several positive
signs sent by other communist parties to develop connections with them and
leaders of the PCI wanted to do their best in order to restore co-operation as
soon as possible.
According to the announcements issued by the party on the New Year’s
Day relationships with all communist parties should be settled, including the
CPSU, the parties of the socialist countries as well as the Chinese communist
party. They had great hopes concerning the attitude of the Chinese party,
which seemed to be flexible to a certain extent in the questions of the Vietnam
War and Chinese-US relations.
According to their interpretation, settling relationships with all commu-
nist parties would not exclude debates about problematic questions, just the
opposite: examining the major reasons of conflicts and diverging opinions.
They expressed that internationalism should not be discussed any more as a
general idea or in abstract terms. “It should be clarified what proletarian
internationalism means at the present, changed environment.”38
The Foreign Department of the Central Committee of MSZMP was especially
positive on the speeches of the 12th Congress of the PCI. Of course, some
details were sharply criticised. “The need for respecting the almost unconditional
independence and autonomy of communist parties, the excessive stress on the special
national ways leading to socialism, a novel interpretation of internationalism, con-
demning one or other measures of the socialist countries, the continuous critique of the
practice of building socialism in socialist countries – in which the PCI took a leading
role – now are almost general features in the West European communist movement.”39
Despite this, in the following section they concluded: “The gain of the
positions of the PCI, accouting to our opinion is an inevitable and positive
consequence of the policy of the PCI, which is well thought and dynamic,
maximally takes into account the realities of Italy and continuously examining,
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analysing and considering multifaceted social life. We have a great opinion on
the internal political line of the PCI, its flexible cooperation politics and its minimum
program, which is based on structural reforms.”40
Kádár soon gave a long interview to l’Unitá.41The interview of Giuseppe Boffa
with the Hungarian first secretary was published in the official journal of the
CPI on Monday, December 1, 1969 – on the 3rd page with a photo. Above the
title “Kádár speaks to Unitá” the following sentence appeared in a box: “the
voice of a main vanguard of the Hungarian experience”. The importance of two
questions was emerging from the others, asking whether political opening
might follow the Hungarian economic mechanism:
Almost two years ago a reform was launched in the Hungarian economy, which
concerns all aspects of the economy and planning. Are you satisfied with the experience,
and do you think that further measures would be necessary towards the same direction?
Do you think that the reforms launched in economic activities – in a very impor-
tant sector in the life of a country – should be completed by reforms of other areas,
especially in the sphere of political activities?
After 1968, the first official meeting of leaders of the two parties took place in
Moscow at the 24th Congress of the CPSU on April 5, 1971.42 The MSZMP
was represented by first secretary Kádár, Komócsin and Dezső Nemes,43 while
the Italian delegation consisted of deputy secretary Berlinguer, political bureau
member Pajetta and central committee members Sergio Segre and Giovanni
Carletti. In his introductory speech, Berlinguer said that in the preceding years
he had been preparing for a journey to Hungary several times but due to sor-
rowful events the planned journey was cancelled. He was hoping that accepting
the invitation he could actually travel to Budapest soon, which had been on
the agenda for a long time.
Berlinguer informed the Hungarian delegation that the PCI was going to
dedicate the press week organised by the Italian communist press in Torino
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that year.44That time the event was planned to be held in September-October
1971. This gesture had a profoundmeaning, since the most supportedWestern
communist party was planning to present the events in Hungary – also pre-
paring for the coming local elections. After the Czechoslovak experience, the
PCI was aching for presenting a positive “dissent” socialism, which could show
that the reforms suggested by the Italian party were viable. Despite that the
ideas of the MSZMP and the PCI were largely different. Results of the new
economic mechanism, reaching its heydays that time, were acknowledged in
Italy also by the broader public not only by the PCI. The agricultural coopera-
tion agreement signed by the two countries can illustrate this, and the possible
Italian participation in Hungarian motorway constructions.
The main result of the Kádár-Berlinguer meeting in Moscow was the invi-
tation of the latter to Hungary. Accompanied by Political Bureau member Ro-
dolfoMecchini, Berlinguer paid his visit in Budapest on July 19-22, 1971. It was
Kádár who gave an account of the talks at the meeting of Eastern Block com-
munist leaders in the Crimea on the first two days in August 1971.45
Differing views on the new economic mechanism of Hungary
After 1968, the Hungarian economic governance reform, which remained alone
in the Eastern Block, was mostly criticised from the viewpoint of the ongoing
integration of the Comecon countries. This provided an opportunity not to top
condemn the whole reform, which was approached by the CPSU right from
its beginning with severe reservations but to object its vital elements. Of course,
the Soviet Union utilised its vantage, since Hungary conducted a third of its
foreign trade with its Eastern neighbour. This trade – overwhelmingly agri-
cultural exports – made the country of Kádár the fifth largest exporter to
Moscow.46
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During the slightlymore than two years following the intervention inCzecho-
slovakia, the survival of the novel Hungarian initiatives was greatly helped by
the developing internal economic crisis in the Soviet Union, because its leader-
ship was engaged in the necessary problem solving that provided a breathing
space for the reformers of the MSZMP. In December 1969, Brezhnev gave a
speech about the difficulties facing the economy of his land, speaking to the
plenum of the CC of the CPSU. The text of the speech was not made public.47
He referred to the slowdown in industrial growth as a worrying symptom,
although it had already occurred in most of the industrially developed coun-
tries but this type of a crisis had been faced in the Soviet Union for the first
time. The growth in labour-productivity fell below the necessary level, moreover,
in certain industrial branches there was no expansion at all. The rise of the
ubiquitously quoted ‘efficacy of social production’ also lost its momentum.
The speech of the general secretary identified subjective and objective roots48
of the difficulties. The slump was mostly explained by difficulties in growth
but the recession was also connected to problems in extensive and intensive
development policies. The proposal presented to the CC suggested employing
the existing equipment and financial resources two or two and a half more
intense to solve the problems. Brezhnev was sharply criticising the work of the
State Planning Committee, which was unable to perform its task. The prob-
lems listed above, in fact, were neuralgic points of an outdated, over-bureau-
cratised thus non-transparent economic structure.
Knowing the semi-official, informal Soviet statements, it was not accidental
that Rezső Nyers,49 who was considered the father of the new economic me-
chanism, was accompanied by well-known anti-reformist Béla Biszku50 in his
consultative visit in Moscow in June 1971, invited by the CPSU. The Soviet
delegation at the talks was lead by Andrei Kirilenko, member of the Politburo
and the secretary of the CC. They discussed the long term development plans
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of the Comecon-integration and the relationship between the Comecon and
international organisations.51
Despite the account made by Nyers, the Soviet party leadership invariably
maintained its earlier announced doubts about the theoretical and political
stand of Hungary concerning its internal economical reorganisation. TheHun-
garian precedent, which often was called simply ‘market socialism’, was also
rejected by Soviet academic circles. Soviet bodies asked for regular updates,
which were provided, on the relationship between the need for technological
developments and prices, on centralised and decentralised fixed capital forma-
tion, on the current state of the economy, the efficacy of the state governance in
the economy, as well as the opinion of workers on the economic mechanism.52
The study made for the Politburo reported the objections of the Soviets
outspokenly:
“The Soviet delegation from time to time expresses worries that in the
frame of the new mechanism the present links between the central gover-
nance and its enforcement do not provide enough guarantee that Hungary
will comply with its intergovernmental duties. They mentioned this problem
several times during the development phase of the long-term agreement,
which was signed in 1971. The source of the problem is that several Hungarian
companies, contrary to our command, in many cases do not match the con-
tingents set by intergovernmental contracts.”53
Views of the Hungarian and Soviet leadership first of all differed the most
– in addition to their fundamentally different opinions on the Hungarian re-
form – on the future development of the price system used in the mutual trade
of Comecon countries. According to the Soviet view, the future development
of the price system which was in place that time should take into account the
internal production costs of the different Comecon countries. In theHungarian
opinion, this would have been possible only if special conditions had been
met (unified pricing guidelines andmethods, harmonising relative prices and
the further elaboration of the exchange rate mechanism). Namely, the practice
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in pricing and cost accounting of the countries concerned differed so much at
the end of the 1960s, which made impossible the direct use of internal costs
and prices in setting prices for foreign trade.
In the period of 1969-1973, the MSZMP sent expert-delegates to the friendly
countries of the Eastern Block and to selected countries in Western Europe
(especially in Italy) where the local communist parties were relatively influen-
tial.54The difference between the future Eurocommunist parties and the eastern
‘brother-parties’ was excellently illustrated by the questions put to the Hunga-
rian delegations and the reactions to the answers given. While the Hungarian
delegates regularly were supported at the events organised by the PCI,55 they
were confronted behind the iron curtain with an ever increasing number of
questions concerning the basic principles of the economic governance in Hun-
gary, the efficacy of its economy, the independence of its companies, the non-
core activity of agricultural companies, the Hungarian contribution to the
economic integration of socialist countries, and the role of Western capital in
reaching the economic goals set by Hungary.56
Chinese relations of the party and the state
after the Prague Spring
The diplomacy of the Kádár era Hungary, after it had settled its relationships
withWestern communist parties, most of all with the PCI that was discussed
above, opened to China as well. The relationship between the two countries
between 1949 and 1959 was ‘fraternal’, according to documents of Hungarian
archives. In these years, top rank official visits were mademutually. János Ká-
dár travelled to China in 1956 and a year later in 1957, Ferenc Münnich57 and
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István Dobi58 in turn paid a visit in Beijing in 1595. Concerning Chinese dele-
gations, Zhu De came to Hungary in 1956 and 1959, while Zhou Enlai was in
Budapest in 1957. TheMSZMP also invitedMao Zedong and head of the state
Liu Shaoqi in these years but the well-known break between the Soviet Union
and China annulled the visits. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was
signed in the period indicated in the document,59 designed for the long term
but becoming a torso. From a legal point of view it remained in force, despite
that after 1965 Budapest and Beijing had no official contacts in addition to dip-
lomatic formalities. Intergovernmental relationships came to a halt, maintai-
ning only foreign trade in specific sectors and the friendly transit transports
from Hungary to Vietnam. The MSZMP initiated both in 1968 and 1970 to
renew the cultural and scientific agreements, the exchange programs and the
contracts between the state radios and televisions but the Chinese either evaded
answering these requests or ignored them.
In the spring of 1971, a draft resolution prepared for the Politburo of the
MSZMP, which was passed later, defined the following key points for a plan-
ned Hungarian-Chinese cooperation program.60
1. In order to restore the unity of the socialist community and the interna-
tional communist movement, the earlier politics of theMSZMP should
be continued: on the one hand, the critique of those Chinese measures,
which aim to undermine the unity of the communist movement thus
hurting the case for socialism, should be continued, and on the other hand,
an effort should be made for improving the intergovernmental relations
– with appropriate gradual advance. Concerning intergovernmental re-
lations, initiatives should mostly be made by using foreign trade issues.
2. In each decision related to China, careful considerations should be made
to the given state of Soviet-Chinese relations and in these cases close
coordination should be maintained with the Soviet comrades.
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58 Former Hungarian politician (1989–1968). Member of the left-wing fraction of the Smallholders
Party. PrimeMinister of Hungary in 1948–1949, Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1949–1952
and Chairman of the Presidential Council in 1952–1967.
59 Ibid.
60HungarianNational Archives (MOL)M-KS 288. 32/B 1971. 38. China (Kína). 436–442.Memo for
the Politburo of the CC of MSZMP on the state of Hungarian-Chinese relations and proposals
for expanding them
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3. At Hungarian and international forums, to the necessary level, the sup-
port for the rightful requests of the People’s Republic of China should
be maintained (UN membership, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao).
4. The Foreign Ministry should try gradually expanding personal contacts
with Chinese diplomats and the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
5. Certain Hungarian delegates travelling to the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam – strictly by central instruction only – should initiate contacts
with Chinese officials especially in areas of trade and scientific-techno-
logical contacts.
6. TheMSZMP should continue to initiate some invitations to non-political
events (exhibitions, scientific conferences).
At the same time when the rather reserved Chine strategy which respected
the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union, was developed, PrimeMinis-
ter Zhou Enlai personally received Foreign Trade Minister József Bíró61 and
Ambassador Ferenc Gódor.62 The counterpart of Bíró, Chinese Foreign Trade
Minister Pai Hsiang-kuo and deputy department director at the Foreign Mi-
nistry Li Ting-chuan also took part in the meeting, which can be interpreted
as the reopening of diplomatic relations, which had been frozen ten years
before. Taking into account the expectations of the CPSU–which presumably
knew about the talks between Zhou and Bíró – the Hungarian PrimeMinister
Jenő Fock,63 who played a key role in the new economic mechanism of Hun-
gary, could not travel to China.
Zhou asked himself about the chances of a future official visit of Kádár or
Fock in Beijing, and raised dozens of questions about certain aspects of the
Hungarian agricultural sector, which had been laid on new foundations since
the middle of the 1960s, expressing his interest in yields, the use of fertilisers,
animal husbandry, the level of machinery used in agriculture but also in cus-
toms problems, the economic relationships with Austria, the development of
cooperatives and state farms, putting emphasis on some questions like the
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61 Former Hungarian communist politician, economist (1921). He was appointed as Minister of Foreign
Trade in 1963 which position he held until 1979.
62 Hungarian National Archives (MOL) M-KS 288. 32/B 1971. 38. China (Kína) 418–425. Strictly
confidential! For Politburo members only
63 Former Hungarian communist politician (1916–2001). From 1967 to 1975 he served as the Chair-
man of the Council of Ministers (~Prime Minister) of the People’s Republic of Hungary. Fock with Rezső
Nyers and József Bálint drew up the New Economic Mechanism in the late 1967.
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use ofmachinery in Hungary compared to Poland, the GDR and Bulgaria. He
was very interested in the growth potential of the Hungarian industry, export
goods and the development of the Hungarian electronic industry.
Reflecting to the courteous proposal of Bíró to improve the Soviet-Chinese
relations, Zhou clearly said no but he did not close out the normalisation of
the links with Hungary. 64
“Two years ago I conducted talks with Kosygin at Beijing airport. Since
then negotiations have started between the two countries on the border issues
that have continued now for one and a half years. We hope they will not last
for 16 years, like the talks between Chinese and US ambassadors. We are pre-
pared in this case also for the worst. Since that time Khrushchev violated the
agreements, has withdrawn the experts. We will negotiate as an equal partner
and we do not bear humiliation or any pressure on us. Thus we welcome very
well that you have visited us. We will welcome Prime Minister Fock if he visits
us… […]Unity can develop only on a base of theoretical agreement. The Soviet
Union is afraid of the US but also chums around with it. We understand what
you told us but I ask you to tell them65 it as well. The question is, whether they
will listen to it or not. For example, we had reached agreements on many
issues with Kosygin here but as he returned to Moscow, they altered several
things. In 1964 we hoped that the new Soviet leadership would be cleverer
than the old one was. That is why I went to Moscow by the commission of
President Mao and the party centre. I tell you honestly, it is more difficult
with the new Soviet leadership to find something in common than it was with
Khrushchev. There is not even such an atmosphere for talks as it was during
Khrushchev. When I was in Moscow, Khrushchev agreed, that I would be
travelling to Budapest. I had interesting talks that time with comrade Kádár.
There is no way now how. PresidentMao is right: this theoretical debate should
be continued for 8,000 years.”66
At the same time, the conflict between Khrushchev (later Brezhnev) and
Mao created the theoretical base for improving the Chinese-Yugoslav relations,
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64By this, he refuted earlier fears of theHungarian ForeignMinistry that in the 1970s Beijing would
still approache the Eastern Block asmonolithic and would not be ready to talk individually with
the theoretically sovereign but in fact Soviet controlled countries of East Europe.
65 Read: to the Soviets
66Hungarian National Archives (MOL)M-KS 288. 32/B 1971. 38. 418–425. Strictly confidential! For
Politburo members only
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which was utilised – according to the given opportunities – by the countries
both opposingMoscow. Since 1966, modest signals of thaw could be discovered
in the relations between Belgrade and Beijing, although that time these were
not going further than slightly elaborating the critique on China in the official
communication of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia. In the argu-
ments used by the leadership of Yugoslavia started to appear elements, accor-
ding to which the developments in China did not fundamentally alter the
socialist conditions of the Chinese society,maybe weakening them at themost.
Parallelly, they increasingly approved the need for analysing the internal mat-
ters of China, rather than expressing univocal critique – the earlier practice.67
Presumably, there were two factors in this period, which affected the obser-
vably changing policy of Yugoslavia against China. First, the revitalisation of the
political idea of the non-aligned movement and second, the direction of
changes in the Soviet-Chinese relations, showing increasing number of signs
that ideological-political conflicts caused tensions in other areas as well. All
of these were catalysed by the 1968 invasion in Czechoslovakia, which was
commented by the CPC with fierce anti-Soviet rhetoric. Although the an-
nouncements of the Yugoslav communist party did never recall the tone of
the Chinese communists, the suppression of the Prague Spring gave a unique
opportunity to increase the level of relations between the two countries to a
higher standard and to expand cooperation both in ideology and practice. It
is not surprising that in the time of the Sino-Soviet border conflict – in the
spring of 1969 – the Yugoslav standpoint was also highly influenced by the re-
peatedly damaged Yugoslav-Soviet relations, becoming tense during the 1968
military action in Czechoslovakia.68
The primary motive behind the friendship between Yugoslavia and China
was an ever developing but never realised anti-Soviet platform, which pro-
vided guidelines for a future cooperation: however this was based on stepping
up againstMoscow rather than forming a joint alternative to it. The shaping up
unity in actions against the political line of the CPSU lost its momentum
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67Nevertheless, the 1967Middle East Crisis overshadowed again – for a while – the growing prob-
lems in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. It narrowed the gap between Yugoslavia and the other
socialist countries thus positive elements in Yugoslav comments on China were temporarily
kept back.
68Hungarian National Archives (MOL)M-KS 288. 32/B 1971. 38. 466–468. Development of Yugo-
slav-Chinese relationships, Report of the embassy in Belgrade April 7, 1971
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early, because the Chinese line – despite of its anti-Soviet stand – also closed out
the cooperation with Western communist parties and the political presence
of Beijing in Albania, understandingly, hurt the interests of Yugoslavia.
Furthermore, tight relations and close cooperation had developed between
the PCI and the Yugoslav communist party since the beginning of the 1960s.69
Despite the problems of Yugoslavia in building socialism, the PCI regarded
Yugoslavia for a long time as the initiator and forerunner of the ‘renewal’ and
‘democratisation’ of socialism. This was also expressed its party press. It often
praised the achievements reached in the constructive work in Yugoslavia and in
democratising social life. Weaknesses of the practice of inner politics in Yu-
goslavia, like the lessons learnt and mistakes made concerning the Croatian
Spring were handled as secondary or negligible. The leadership of the Italian
party considered only the foreign policy concepts of Yugoslavia as always
dangerous, naming and criticising them at inter-party talks.70
In the background of the Soviet-Chinese and the Soviet-Yugoslav conflicts,
utilising the fact that the removal of Dubček had dramatically reduced the
credibility of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the West-European communist
parties, especially of the PCI, the Italian communist party made its first cau-
tious steps towards the CPC. For the PCI the unity of the international labour
movement was the first priority, and to achieve it they had a critical approach
both towards the realities in the Soviet Union and in China. Nevertheless,
they had never questioned the historical role of the Soviet Union and also
rejected the ‘extremisms’ ofMaoism.71Although, at consultations of the large
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69HungarianNational Archives (MOL)M-KS 288. 32/B 1972. 93. 6–8. Note on the Italian-Yugoslav
inter-party relationships
70 Giancarlo Pajetta told János Kádár, at their meeting in January 1972, that he had good impres-
sions at his visit in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1971. But Croatian student actions and party
announcements and measures signalled a critical turn, of which content the PCI did not see
clearly. (Pajetta often visited Budapest and he spent his summer vacation several times in Hun-
gary. According to the personal memory of János Berecz, “it was enough to call Pajetta and he
came immediately.”)
71Nevertheless, in the eve of announcing eurocommunism, reflecting to the death ofMao, theUnità
published an extensive article praising the development made by the People’s Republic of China
under the guidance of Mao. In its editorial on September 10, the journal highlighted that Chi-
nese leaders “always linked their fight with the reality of national life and the traditions of the
Chinese people… and they followed the policy of national unity” – considering it one of their
greatest honour.
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European communist parties and at other bilateral talks, the PCI distanced
itself from the dissent Chinese line undermining the unity of the movement
but it started to search connections to the CPC from the end of the 1960s. The
MSZMP which maintained excellent relationship with the Italian commu-
nists did it similarly.72 Contrary to the Hungarian party being in the Eastern
Block, the PCI was able to utilise and in fact used the opportunity given by the
Soviet-Chinese opposition, arguing covertly that the CPSU was also respon-
sible for the crisis of the communistmovement suffering from the lack of unity.73
This was only amplified by the strict rejection of the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia. It is excellently illustrated by the speech given by Agostino
Novella74 at the 10th congress of the MSZMP.75
“We believe that the Soviet Union is paying a fundamental role in the fight,
which is fought by peoples against imperialist oppression and for the victory
of socialism.We confirm again that we maintain solidarity with all the socialist
countries, which form the most solid pillar in the fight against imperialism
and for preserving peace. This solidarity of ours is the result of a fully indepen-
dent analysis of the situation. And this independence is regarded by our party
as a fundamental element of its politics – in case of any conditions and con-
cerning all national or international problems, including questions emerging
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72 Hungarian National Archives (MOL) M-KS 288. 32/B 1974. 115. 34–38. Since 1973, the PCI and
the MSZMP harmonised their activities on the basis of a cooperation programme signed mu-
tually. “There is no full theoretical-ideological unity between our parties (concepts on socialism
and the transition to it) and our announced views on political issues differ temporarily or per-
manently (certain factors in international politics, the Czechoslovak question, the excessive Ita-
lian critique on the practice of inner politics in the socialist countries etc.). Our relationship is
open, honest and – despite different views – fair and tight, debates are tolerated.”
73 They shared the view of the French PCF, which also criticised the CPSU and rejected the Chi-
nese line. However, the internal structure of the PCF resembled much more to the condemned
Soviet state-party than to the PCI. Thus one of the characteristic and specific feature of the
PCF was its insistence on maintaining both its right for independent critique and its alliance
with the Soviet Union. This theoretical stand caused several conflict situations in the future,
because its politics was based strongly both on its national identity and its loyalty to Moscow.
Although, it is also true that the PCF was more dependent on Moscow, both in its traditions
and financing, than their comrades in Italy.
74 Former Italian communist politician, syndicalist worker (1905–1974). Between 1972 and 1974 he was
one of Berlinguer’s closest advisers.
75 Hungarian National Archives (MOL) M-KS 288. 32/B 1970. 157. 138–145.
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in the international labour movement as well. As a result of this, we endeavour
to value the experience of the communist movement of each country in a fair
way. We believe that the independence interpreted this way should be an in-
dispensable feature of any international revolutionary party of a nation. The
existence of some disagreements76 concerning certain political problems –
although sometimes they might be significant – cannot weaken the interna-
tional commitment of communists and it cannot shake their unity.”
Only a year later, when Berlinguer met Kádár inMoscow – initiated by the
PCI – the deputy of Longo criticised the Soviet Union sharply. According to
him, there was a contradiction between the otherwise proper ideas fixed in the
Soviet constitution and the practice in enforcing them.77 On his visit in Bu-
dapest which followed his Moscow talks, Berlinguer told the leaders of the
MSZMP in 1971 that the PCI had never agreed with the Cultural Revolution
in China but always tried to examine and understand realities there, and it
wanted to settle its relations with the CPC – while preserving its own position.
In addition, he considered the improvement of relations between socialist
countries, especially between the Soviet Union and China, as of primary in-
terest. According to them, lifting the isolation of China might cause positive
changes as they would be forced to lead a more realistic foreign policy in the
future. Concerning the reforms in Hungary, Berlinguer emphasized that Italian
communists had great sympathy for Hungary, the MSZMP and János Kádár
personally. They considered the style of the Hungarian party-leadership good,
especially that no superlatives and self-glorification were used concerning the
well-known achievements.78
Frequent visits of PCI leaders in Budapest and Belgrade opened a short
livedwindowof opportunity to develop a communist alternative utilising all the
different experiences. An end was put to it, when the new economic mecha-
nism in Hungary was discredited and it was completely taken off the agenda.
Despite this, the Italian, Hungarian and Yugoslav parties were able to estab-
lish viable cooperation in the examined period, due to their commitment for
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76 An ink remark on the document: „According to them, what are those?”
77 Hungarian National Archives (MOL) M-KS 288. 32/B 1971. 47. 6–7.
78 Hungarian National Archives (MOL) M-KS 288. 32/B 1972. 69. 617–624. Report of the Foreign
Department of the CC of the MSZMP, July 24, 1971 on the visit of Enrico Berlinguer and Ro-
dolfo Mecchini, Strictly confidential.
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reforms, openness to China and geographical proximity. They always respected
the different limits of each other’s room for manoeuvre, which allowed the
Italians to maintain dissent views on the Yugoslav model and on the Hunga-
rian reform in economic governance.
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